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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the importance of assumptions made about market structure and firm 
behavior in empirical trade policy analysis. The contribution to the relevant literature is 
threefold: first the paper develops two original models which incorporate imperfectly 
competitive market structures in a spatial modeling framework; then it proposes a 
procedure to identify  the degree of market power in international trading which is 
consistent with observed prices and traded quantities, and applies it to the banana market; 
finally, it assesses how analysis of the implications of recent changes in the EU import 
regimes for bananas (the Economic Partnership Agreements and the December 2009 WTO 
agreement) is affected by the assumptions made on the prevailing market structure.       
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Modeling Trade Policies under Alternative Market Structures 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Growing attention has been recently devoted to the role of intermediaries in international 
trade. Recent studies show that 24% of US imports are handled by “pure” intermediaries, 
that is, wholesalers and retailers, while on the export side they account for 11% of total 
trade (Bernard et al.,  2010). The role of intermediaries has been highlighted also for Chilean 
imports - 35% are handled by wholesalers and 6% by retailers (Blum et al., 2010) -  and for 
China - 22% and 18% of total Chinese exports and imports, respectively, are handled by 
Chinese intermediaries (Ahn et al., 2010). Intermediaries are particularly important in 
several agricultural commodity markets, such as cereals, sugar, bananas and coffee, in which 
a small number of trading firms (not necessarily private) account for a large share of world 
trade and are, potentially, in the position to exert market power.  These trading firms are, by 
and large, “pure” middlemen, that seldom produce themselves the products they trade. 
 
The aim of this paper is to address the relevance of the assumptions about market 
structure and trader behavior in empirical analyses of trade policies; in particular when 
studying trade policy issues concerning commodity markets in which traders play an 
important role, the assumption of perfect competition may be restrictive and policy 
prescriptions obtained based on this assumptions distorted. Yet, empirical trade policy 
analysis often relies on this very assumption (McCorriston, 2002).  
The paper analyzes recent changes in the European Union (EU) import regime for 
bananas, namely the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the December 2009 
WTO agreement which put end to the “banana war”. For several decades the EU import 
regime for bananas had been the cause of heated political confrontation, both domestically 
and internationally (Anania, 2006; Josling and Taylor, 2003). The EPAs made EU banana 
imports originating from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries duty- and quota-free 
(previously they were subject to a duty-free quota, with out-of-quota imports subject to the 
MFN tariff), while the WTO agreement called for a reduction of the EU MFN tariff on 
bananas. This case study is used to provide insights into the effects of assumptions on non 
competitive behaviors by international traders in the evaluation of the impact of trade 
policies. In fact, the banana trade is among the most evident examples of high concentration 
in international markets, with three international trading firms accounting for over 65% of 
world trade. The EU Commission (EC, 2008; EC, 2011) has found that five banana traders 
have violated EU rules on competition, and consequently imposed fines. Making different 
assumptions about market structure, the paper provides a quantitative assessment first of 
the impact of the trade preferences the EU granted ACP countries with the EPAs, and then of 
the erosion of these preferences resulting from the reduction of its MFN import tariff for 
bananas under the December 2009 WTO agreement. The banana market is possibly the one 
in which benefits from trade preferences granted by the EPAs and potential losses from 
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preference erosion are the greatest (Alexandraki and Lankes, 2006; Low et al., 2009; Yang, 
2005).
 
We use a single commodity, spatial, mathematical programming model. Compared to 
general equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models allow for a better representation of 
complex policy instruments, a more detailed representation of markets and require less 
restrictive assumptions. The choice of a spatial  model – i.e., a model which is able to 
generate trade flows between each pair of countries – is due to the fact that it is particularly 
effective in representing policies where different regimes apply to imports from different 
sources, without having to impose at times questionable assumptions, such as imperfect 
substitution between goods produced in different countries (Armington, 1969). Current and 
previous EU trade regimes for bananas considered in this paper include preferential tariffs 
and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) applied on imports from specific groups of countries. The paper 
develops two modified versions of the Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial trade model 
representing imperfectly competitive market structures: the extreme case of international 
trading firms forming a cartel and the intermediate case of traders behaving as downstream 
oligopolists and upstream oligopsonists. A two step calibration procedure is used to make 
the models replicate observed trade data; this allows us to address a key issue, that is, which 
degrees of market power and which market structures are compatible with the observed 
data. This approach differs from those in the relevant literature. The degree of market 
power and market structure in an industry are often estimated by means of econometric 
studies based on industrial economics models (Perloff et al., 2007), while we use a 
calibration procedure. Following the pioneering work of Dixit (1988), calibration has been 
extensively used in empirical trade policy analysis to obtain the conjectural variation 
parameter, as a way to represent all market structures, from perfect competition to the pure 
monopoly case; however, notwithstanding its extensive use,  concerns have been raised 
about the lack of theoretical foundations of the concept of conjectural variation (Vives, 
2001; Helpmann and Krugman, 1989). In this paper, we do not use conjectural variations; 
rather we address the issue of the market structure and the degree of market power by 
calibrating different models representing a range of market structures. Assumptions made 
on the market structure make the difference both in terms of the extent of the expected 
impact of a policy change and of its sign.1  
With respect to the banana market, results show that observed data are not 
compatible with the existence of a cartel of international traders; in fact, observed traded 
quantities and prices are consistent with market structures with a relatively low degree of 
market power. The EPAs are expected to increase ACP exports to the EU by a considerable 
amount and generate consistent benefits for ACP countries, while the 2009 WTO agreement 
on bananas significantly reduces the preferential margin for ACP countries, but does not 
                                                     
1
 Soregaroli et al. (2011) show how assumptions on market structure in the supply chain of dairy products in 
Italy affect price transmission mechanisms and result in price responses in opposite directions to a change in 
the European Union Common Agricultural Policy.  
Page 4 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
4 
 
offset the benefits from the EPAs. One interesting finding is that, as the degree of market 
power increases, market structure becomes important not only in terms of the expected 
magnitude of the impact of policy changes, but in terms of its sign as well. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the significance of 
imperfect competition for the banana industry, while section three presents the model and 
section four illustrates the calibration procedure used and the results obtained in terms of 
feasible market structures in the banana trade; the fifth section discusses the results of the 
policy analysis, while the final one offers concluding remarks.  
2. Market structure and firm behavior in the banana industry  
Ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, the banana trade has been highly 
concentrated, with large firms’ market share remaining relatively stable over the years 
(Taylor, 2003). Estimates suggest that during the eighties and the nineties the top three 
firms - Dole, Chiquita and Del Monte - accounted for 60-65% of world imports, with two 
companies - Noboa and Fyffes - lagging behind with an overall 10% and 8% of world imports, 
respectively (Arias et al., 2003). More recent estimates indicate the share of the top three 
firms on world exports in 2010 remains close to 65%, with Noboa and Fyffes together 
accounting for another 12%; according to these estimates, around 10% of world exports is 
now held by a small number of newcomer “Russian companies” controlling the rapidly 
growing Russian market (Bananalink, 2011). The top three firms dominate the US market, 
accounting for almost 90% of US imports, while their share of EU imports is around 45%, 
with Fyffes controlling another 20% (Arias et al., 2003; EC, 2008).  
Marked concentration,  small number of entries – which suggest high entry costs – and 
almost no exits are all, in theory, indicators of the potential exercise of market power in the 
banana trading industry. Although the presumption that large banana traders do not behave 
competitively is very common, the few empirical studies estimating the degree of market 
power in the banana market – which, however, are limited in time and geographical 
coverage – do not provide consistent evidence in support of this assumption. Focusing on 
the German banana market, Deodhar and Sheldon (1995 and 1996) found that trading firms 
selling bananas to retailers did not behave perfectly competitively, but rather engaged in 
Cournot behavior. With reference once again to the case of Germany, Herrmann and Sexton 
(2001) found no evidence of market power at the import stage.  
The lack of evidence of the exercise of market power by banana traders partly explains 
the assumption of perfect competition in most studies assessing the impact of EU policy 
changes (e.g. Anania, 2006 and 2010; Guyomard et al., 1999a and 1999b; Kersten, 1995;  
Spreen et al., 2004; Vanzetti et al., 2005). Very few papers have assumed oligopolistic 
behavior by banana traders. McCorriston and Sheldon (1996) have assessed the impact of 
the introduction in 1993 of the banana tariff rate quotas regime using a vertically-related 
market model in which imperfect competition is assumed at each stage. In the model, which 
they calibrated with 1989 UK banana market data, they consider two stages: the ripening 
industry sells a homogeneous product to the retail industry, which distributes two brands of 
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the product, perceived by consumers as different on the basis of their country of origin. 
Neither industry behaves competitively and the nature of competition is captured at each 
stage by a conjectural variation parameter, obtained using Dixit’s approach (Dixit, 1988). 
They found that the degree of pass-through of the changes in tariffs to retail prices is 20% 
lower than under the assumption of perfect competition, 10% higher than under a pure two-
stage oligopoly and 30 % higher than under a two-stage monopoly. McCorriston (2000) 
further investigated the impact of the 1993 EU banana trade policy reform by using a single-
stage oligopoly model, in which the nature of competition is still captured by the conjectural 
variation parameter, calibrated for each EU member country. He found that the degree of 
pass-through of policy changes to the retail price varies across member countries, with UK 
and Italy having the lowest level of pass-through and, thus, the highest degree of market 
power.   
Evidence of non competitive behaviors by banana traders has recently been found by 
the EU Commission, first for eight Northern European countries
2 during the period 2000-
2002 (EC, 2008), and then for three Southern European countries
3
 in 2004-2005 (EC, 2011).  
According to the Commission, four banana traders in the first case – namely, Chiquita, Del 
Monte, Dole and Weichert (by that time controlled by Del Monte) – and two in the more 
recent one – Chiquita and Pacific Fruit – violated EU rules on competition by explicitly 
coordinating their weekly decisions on the selling prices of bananas.4 The fines imposed by 
the Commission amounted to 60 million euro in the first case and to 8.9 in the second one.  
The conclusions of the Commission, therefore, seem to indicate the existence, at least for 
the periods for which evidence has been found, of a cartel between some of the major 
banana traders, which were found guilty of collusion in the EU market. This introduces a new 
hypothesis regarding the behavior of banana traders: while previous literature has always 
assumed non-cooperative behaviors among (oligopolistic) banana traders, the findings of the 
EU Commission suggest that this may not be the case. 
The conflicting evidence on firms’ behavior in the banana trading industry leads us to 
contrast, in the policy simulations, the results under the assumption of perfect competition 
with those obtained assuming a range of different market structures.   
3. The model 
 
The model is a single commodity, spatial, partial equilibrium, mathematical programming 
model; following Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge (1971) a “quasi-welfare” 
function is maximized subject to a set of constraints describing relevant demand and supply 
functions, price linkages (due, for example, to transportation costs and policy interventions) 
                                                     
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
3 Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
4
 “The parties engaged in bilateral pre-pricing communications during which they discussed banana price 
setting factors, that is factors relevant for setting of quotation prices for the upcoming week and discussed or 
disclosed price trends and/or indications of quotation prices for the up-coming week … Such communications 
took place before the parties set their quotation prices. All these communications were relevant for the future 
setting of quotation prices.” (EC, 2008, p.17). 
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and policies which cannot be represented through exogenously determined price wedges 
(such as import quotas). The version of the model used in this study differs from the one 
used in Anania (2010) in three respects: it builds on an updated data base, which now refers 
to 2007, rather than 2005; includes the modeling of imperfectly competitive market 
structures; and makes the shifts over time of the supply functions as a result of technical 
changes driven, in addition to expected changes in yields, by changes in land allocated to 
banana production. 
 
Bananas are assumed to be a homogeneous product; this means that the effectiveness 
of branding in differentiating bananas is ruled out,5 “fair trade” and organic bananas, which 
account for a fairly small but significant and growing portion of the market, are ignored, and 
consumers are assumed to be unable to differentiate bananas on the basis of their country 
of origin. The model includes five sources of domestic supply within the EU,6 fourteen 
exporting
7
 and four importing
8
 countries/regions. Import demand and export supply 
functions, as well as domestic supply functions in the EU, are assumed to be linear, or to be 
well approximated by linear functions in their portions relevant for the simulations 
conducted. 
 
Production functions in the EU and import demand and export supply functions in 
other countries/regions in the base year are obtained from observed produced, imported 
and exported quantities, observed production, import and export prices, and supply, export 
supply and import demand price elasticities at the equilibrium in each country/region (table 
1). The values of the elasticities used are exogenous to the model and are based on those 
used elsewhere (Anania, 2010; Arias et al., 2005; Guyomard et al., 1999a and 1999b; 
Kersten, 1995; Spreen et al., 2004; and Vanzetti et al., 2005) (table 1). Net imports, net 
exports and average import and export unit values have been computed on the basis of 
information from the COMTRADE and FAOSTAT databases. Data for Martinique and 
Guadalupe, Canary Islands, Madeira and Azores, and Crete are based on information from 
the European Commission.  
The modeling of the EU-27 import regime in 2007 includes:  
(a) for bananas originating in MFN countries, the “tariff only” import regime introduced in 
2006 (the import tariff equals 176 €/t); 
(b) for bananas originating in ACP countries, a 775,000 t TRQ, with duty-free in-quota 
imports and out-of-quota imports subject to the MFN tariff (176 €/t); 
 
(c) for bananas originating in LDCs, unlimited duty-free imports.  
                                                     
5 Some evidence exists that Chiquita is able to exert a price premium (EC, 2008; Arias et al., 2003) due to its 
branding efforts as well as the somewhat higher quality of its bananas.  
6 Cyprus, France (Martinique and Guadeloupe), Greece (Crete), Portugal (Madeira and Azores) and Spain 
(Canary Islands). Banana production in continental Portugal is negligible and has been ignored. 
7
 Five ACP countries/regions: Belize and Suriname, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ivory Coast, and the 
aggregate of other non-LDC ACP net exporters; eight MFN countries/regions: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and the aggregate of other non-LDC MFN net exporters; and LDC net 
exporters. 
8
 EU15, EU12, United States, and the aggregate of Rest of the world net importers. 
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For the US and the “Rest of the world net importers” the model includes the tariffs 
applied in 2007 (0.5 and 22.2%, respectively). 
The 2006 reform of the EU domestic policy regime for bananas “decoupled” support 
for banana producers outside the “outermost regions” of the EU moving it into the “single 
farm payment” introduced with the 2003 Fischler reform of the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy; this means that banana production in Greece, Cyprus and continental Portugal is 
driven by market forces only, while in the “outermost regions” (France; Spain; Azores and 
Madeira in Portugal) different regimes apply (Anania, 2008).  
In the 2007 base model the reference scenario with perfectly competitive markets is 
modeled by maximizing a standard “quasi-welfare” function (Samuelson, 1952; Takayama 
and Judge, 1971):
 
                           qdj                          q
s
i 
      Max W (xin , xqie , xmfnie )    =   ∑j   ∫ pdj(m) dm    -  ∑i  ∫ psi(r) dr    -              (1) 
                                                                        0                 0 
                               -  ∑i ∑j (TCij xij) - ∑i ∑e (xmfnie TMFNie ) - ∑i ∑n (xin Tin )  ,              
subject to: 
 q
s
i    =  ∑j xij       (2) 
q
d
j   =   ∑i xij ,  (3) 
ssi = BSPi  / (BSQi ESi )  (4) 
sii  = BSPi  -  ssi BSQi     (5) 
p
s
i  =  sii  +  ssi q
s
i      (6) 
dsj = BDPj  / (BDQj EDj )     (7) 
dij = BDPj  - dsj BDQj       (8) 
p
d
j  =  dij  + dsj  q
d
j       (9) 
∑i  ∑e xqie    ≤   TRQ      (10) 
xie  = xmfnie + xqie      (11) 
and   xij  , xmfnie ,  xqie , p
s
i , p
d
j  ≥   0  ,    
where :  
i  is an index for exporting countries and for sources of domestic supply in the EU;  
j
 
is an index for importing countries; 
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e is an index for EU15 and EU12;  
n 
 
is an index for non-EU importing countries; 
 
BDPj is country j’s import price (cif) in base year (2007); 
BDQj is country j’s net imports in base year (2007); 
BSPi is country i’s export price (fob) in base year (2007); 
BSQi is country i’s net exports in base year (2007); 
dij is country j’s import demand intercept; 
dsj is country j’s import demand slope; 
EDj is country j’s import demand elasticity; 
ESi is country i’s export supply elasticity; 
p
d
j   is country j’s import price;  
p
d
j(m) is country j’s inverse import demand function; 
p
s
i   is country i’s export price;  
p
s
i(r) is country i’s inverse export supply function; 
q
d
j is country j’s total imports;  
q
s
i  is country i’s total exports;  
sii is country i’s export supply intercept; 
ssi is country i’s export supply slope  
Tin  is the per unit import tariff imposed by country n on its imports from country i ;  
TCij is the per unit international transaction cost for shipments from country i to country 
j (border to border); 
 
TMFNie  is the MFN import tariff imposed by EU member states e on their imports from 
country i (this applies to imports from MFN importers and on out-of-quota imports 
from ACP countries);  
TRQ is EU preferential tariff rate quota for ACP countries; 
xij is the trade flow from country i to country j;   
xmfnie is the trade flow from country i to EU member states e subject to the MFN import 
tariff; and  
xqie  is the trade flow from country i to EU member states e within the preferential duty-
free TRQ for ACP countries.
 
In order to assess how the simulation of the effects of policy changes are affected 
when the assumption that international markets are perfectly competitive is relaxed, we 
consider two other market structures: (a) the extreme case of international trading firms 
jointly maximizing their profits by forming a cartel exerting monopsony power in their 
relations with exporters and monopoly power with respect to importers; and (b) the 
intermediate case of international traders behaving as downstream oligopolists and 
upstream oligopsonists, considering different degrees of market power. Upstream and 
downstream firms are assumed to have no market power. 
The first non-competitive behavior considered is a cartel, that is, the presence of a 
number of colluding firms which maximize joint profits; this stylizes in the international 
market the EU Commission’s detection on its domestic market of the existence of a stable 
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cartel of banana traders (EC, 2008; EC, 2011). A cartel is likely to emerge and be stable if 
expected future losses due to sanctions as a result of deviating from the cartel are higher 
than the immediate gains from deviating (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). As in other 
industries where collusive behaviors have been detected, two main factors support the 
hypothesis of a sustainable banana cartel. First, there are few large firms and almost no 
entries; under these circumstances, the enforcement of the firms’ agreement and the threat 
to punish deviating behaviors are both likely to be effective. Second, the relatively low 
elasticities of demand, at least in the largest developed country markets, provide a strong 
incentive to increase prices above the competitive level. We assume that colluding traders 
are able to exert market power upstream as well as downstream; thus, the cartel is assumed 
to exert monopsony power with respect to exporters and monopoly power with respect to 
importers. This market structure is modeled by maximizing traders’ total profits, given by 
total revenues across all importing countries minus international transaction costs, banana 
acquisition costs across all exporting countries and tariff expenditure:
 
Max Π (xin , xqie , xmfnie ) = ∑i ∑j ( pdj  - psi - TCij ) xij – ∑i ∑e (xmfnie TMFNie )  
                   - ∑i ∑n (xin Tin )  . 9                (12) 
In between perfect competition and the cartel, a range of possible non-competitive 
behaviors are introduced in the model by considering different mark-up values. The mark-up 
is defined as: 
                                                              
p ck
c
−
=                                                                       (13)      
where p is the selling price and c  is the marginal cost. Let ji
j i i
dX
dX
λ
≠
=∑   be the conjecture 
that firm i  has on the impact that a change in its output iX  has on the sum of the outputs 
chosen by each of its rivals, jX . If firms are symmetric:  
                                                           (1 )i i
sk λ
ε
= +                   (14) 
with is being the market share of each firm i  andε  the demand elasticity. 
Under Cournot behavior equation (14) reduces to the usual Cournot equation i
sk
ε
= , 
while under a cartel it reduces to the usual monopoly equation 
1k
ε
= . 
                                                     
9
 Takayama and Judge (1971, chapter 11) discuss the potential problem of arbitraging in spatial models with 
imperfect competition. While procedures exist to address the problem (Anania and McCalla, 1991), in the 
model proposed in this paper it is ruled out a priori because regions are modeled either as exporters or as 
importers (hence, they cannot export and import at the same time).  
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We model firm oligopolistic/oligopsonist behaviors by considering different 
percentages of mark-up. To provide the reader with a feeling of the implications in terms of 
market structure of the assumptions in our modeling of the banana market, the values of 
mark-up under three benchmark market behaviors - perfect competition or Bertrand (under 
which, if the product is homogeneous, the mark-up is zero), Cournot and a cartel - are 
reported in table 2. This table reports the values of the mark-up for two different values of 
the demand elasticity (assuming firms sell bananas on one market only). We believe that, 
among those considered in table 2, only the mark-ups in the central columns, that is, a 
number of (identical) firms equal to 11, 7 and 5, appear to be plausible representations for 
the world banana trading industry. In our model different mark-up values are considered, 
ranging from 3% to 25%. With the lower value of elasticity, corresponding to the one 
assumed in the policy simulations for the EU-15, a mark-up equal to 3% is consistent with 
behaviors that are close to perfect competition. A mark-up equal to 12% corresponds to 
conjectures that are close to Cournot only when there are more than 16 firms, which is a 
rather implausible hypothesis for the banana trading industry. However, with a higher 
elastiticity - corresponding to the one assumed for the EU-12 and close to that assumed for 
the aggregate of the ‘Other net importers’ - a mark-up equal to 12% corresponds to Cournot 
if there are  11 firms. Higher mark-up values, such as 20%, correspond to an industry which 
is less competitive than Cournot; this occurs if there are more than 10 and 6 firms, under the 
lower and higher elasticity value assumptions, respectively.    
This third market structure is modeled by maximizing a “quasi-welfare” function 
(Takayama and Judge, 1971) modified to include trading firm profits calculated using the 
mark-up:   
 
                           qdj                           q
s
i 
            Max W (xin , xqie , xmfnie )    =   ∑j   ∫ pdj(m) dm    -  ∑i  ∫ psi(r) dr    -            (15) 
                                                                         0                  0 
                       -  ∑i ∑j (TCij xij) - ∑i ∑e (xmfnie TMFNie ) - ∑i ∑n (xin Tin )  - ∑i ∑j (MUij xij) ,  
where  MUij  is the traders per unit profit on shipments from exporter i to importer j 
obtained by applying the (exogenously determined) percentage of mark-up to total per unit 
costs, specific to that trade flow, incurred by the trader (acquisition price + international 
transaction cost).10 
 
Spatial models which include imperfectly competitive market structures and assume, 
as we do, a perfectly homogeneous product have been proposed by Takayama and Judge 
(1971), Kawaguchi et al. (1997) and Yang et al. (2002). Our model differs from these in 
several ways. Takayama and Judge (1971, chapter 11) extend their standard model to 
include a profit maximizing monopolist handling production and trade across all regions. In 
                                                     
10
 Results do not change significantly if the mark-up is applied to a total per unit cost for the trading firm which 
includes the import tariff.  
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the cartel case our model modifies this framework by separating producers from traders 
(seen as pure middlemen) and assuming the cartel of traders to hold monopolistic as well as 
monopsonistic power, while upstream (and downstream) firms have no market power. 
Kawaguchi et al. (1997) propose a modified Takayama and Judge model which explicitly 
includes conjectural variation parameters; however, they assume these parameters equal 
zero, i.e. Cournot competition to occur (with all firms exerting market power or a subset). In 
our model market power is exerted by traders rather than each country’s producers, 
imperfect competition is represented through the percentage of mark-up  and a range of 
imperfect competition market structures is simulated, including Cournot. The adoption of 
different percentages of mark-up to represent the market structure allows us to avoid 
having to identify each firm’s conjectural variation parameter for each importing country, 
and making explicit assumptions about the number and symmetry of firms. Yang et al. 
(2002) propose a linear complementarity programming formulation of the classical 
Takayama and Judge spatial model for a market characterized by heterogeneous downward 
sloping demand and upward sloping supply functions (as assumed here), while they suggest 
the standard Takayama and Judge spatial modeling framework when a common demand 
function and constant marginal costs are considered. They assume Cournot competition, 
whereas we consider a range of firm behaviors and use a modified Takayama and Judge 
modeling framework. 
 
As in most policy analyses, we also assume that firms behavior is not affected by policy 
changes, i.e.  that the simulated policy shocks do not influence the  behavior of firms.  
4. The feasible market structures  
One characteristic of mathematical programming spatial models is that predicted bilateral 
trade flows show an overspecialization with respect to those observed, i.e. the solution 
includes a smaller number of non-zero trade flows than those observed. This is the  result of 
the optimization procedure used as well as the inability of the constraints included in the 
model to fully represent the complexity of the market under scrutiny, because of both the 
poor quality of available information and the simplified representation in the model of the 
behavior of market agents. In models like the one developed in this paper the information 
which appears weaker is the matrix of bilateral international transaction costs. In our model 
these have been generated from available industry information on international transaction 
costs for few specific bilateral trade flows, using distances between countries to explain 
differences in the variable component of transaction costs. The two step calibration 
procedure proposed by Paris et al. (2011) has been used to make up for the poor quality of 
per unit transaction costs and improve the capacity of the base model to reproduce 
observed net trade positions as well as bilateral trade flows. Essentially, information 
regarding the observed market equilibrium is used to infer the errors in bilateral 
international transaction costs which, once corrected, make the model perfectly calibrate 
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observed country net trade positions.
11
 In the first step the model is augmented by a set of 
constraints imposing that predicted bilateral trade flows equal observed ones. In step two 
these constraints are removed and the values of the dual variables associated in the solution 
in step one to these constraints are used to correct per unit international transaction costs. 
The solution of the model in step two perfectly replicates observed country net trade 
positions; in general, there are multiple optimal sets of bilateral trade flows associated to 
observed net trade positions, observed trade flows being one of these sets (Paris et al., 
2011).
 12
  
To explain how the calibration procedure works in the modeling of the three market 
structures considered we shall make use of a few figures. In figure 1 a two country, perfectly 
competitive market is represented, with no policy intervention; EDj and ESi are the 
importer’s import demand function and the exporter’s export supply function, respectively, 
and tcij is the per unit international transaction cost, assumed not to change with the 
quantity traded. Point A gives the market equilibrium as generated by the model if no 
calibration procedure is considered (the solution is such that the quantity traded, (X°ij), 
makes the import price (P°j) equal to the export price (P°i) augmented by the per unit 
transaction cost); the solution generated by the model differs from observed traded quantity 
(Xij), and import and export prices (Pj and Pi , respectively).
13 The calibration procedure 
enables the model to reproduce the observed market equilibrium by correcting the per unit 
transaction cost; in this case by increasing it by an amount equal to  λ*ij.14 Figure 2 is 
analogous to figure 1 for the imperfectly competitive market where a mark-up is applied 
(observed traded quantity and prices in the two countries, as well as the per unit transaction 
cost are kept unchanged). In figure 2 ES*i is the mark-up inclusive export supply by the 
traders; in this case the uncalibrated equilibrium generated by the model would be that at 
point B. When the calibration procedure is applied, the adjustment of the per unit 
transaction cost,  λ*ij , by correcting the per unit transaction cost, also modifies the mark-up 
inclusive export supply by the traders (which becomes ES**i ); this happens because the 
transaction cost is part of the cost the percentage mark-up is applied to in order to obtain 
the traders’ per unit profit. Finally, in figure 3 point C represents the equilibrium quantity 
                                                     
11 The calibration procedure implicitly assumes that the only potentially ill-measured information in the model 
are bilateral international transaction costs. 
12
 When an observed bilateral trade flow is equal to zero, the calibration procedure generates a correction 
which can either be positive (if the uncalibrated model solution predicts a positive trade flow) or equal to zero 
(if it predicts, as observed, that no trade occurs between the two countries). In the former case the corrected 
per unit bilateral transaction cost will give, rather than a point estimate of the unknown bilateral transaction 
cost, only its lower bound. From the point of view of using the calibration procedure to assess the feasible 
degrees of market power this issue is irrelevant; in fact, a market structure which is found feasible (or 
unfeasible) would remain so if more information on bilateral transaction costs associated to zero trade flows 
would be available. In addition, because of the way import demand and export supply functions are 
constructed, the calibration of bilateral transaction costs does not depend on the values of the price elasticities 
of these functions.  
13
 Observed traded quantity, import and export prices lie on the inverse import demand and export supply 
functions because of the way these have been obtained. 
14
 The correction of the transaction cost needed to calibrate the model can, in general, be either positive or 
negative. 
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when traders form a cartel and act as a monopolist/monopsonist on the world market and 
the model is not calibrated. MR and MC represent the traders’ marginal revenue and 
marginal cost functions, respectively (observed traded quantity and prices and the per unit 
transaction cost  are the same as in the two other market structures represented in figures 1 
and 2). In this case, in the market equilibrium obtained by solving the model with no 
calibration the quantity traded is below the observed one, suggesting the need to calibrate 
the model by correcting the transaction cost downward, rather than upward as in the 
previous two cases. However, even setting the per unit transaction cost equal zero is 
insufficient to make the model generate the observed market equilibrium. An adjustment of 
transaction costs to make them negative is needed for the model to reproduce the observed 
market equilibrium; this would mean traders receiving, for each unit of bananas traded, a 
“subsidy” which exceeds transaction cost. 
This is exactly what happens when the model assuming in the world market for 
bananas a cartel maximizing joint profits is calibrated. This means that the hypothesis of 
traders forming a cartel that acts as a monopolist and a monopsonist in the banana market 
turns out to be unfeasible, being inconsistent with observed quantities traded and importer 
and exporter border prices. The adjustments needed for the model to reproduce observed 
net trade positions and import and export prices are of an order of magnitude which rules 
out any possibility of this result stemming from measurement errors of import and export 
prices, including those resulting from observed prices possibly being intra-firm transfer 
prices, rather than prices resulting from market transactions between different firms. In fact, 
the downward adjustments of transaction costs needed to calibrate the model range 
between 754 and 2,710 US$/t and the resulting corrected transaction costs between -553 
and -2,600 US$/t.  
This result may not come as a surprise, given that a world cartel, even for the banana 
market, is a rather extreme assumption. However, the findings for the other imperfectly 
competitive market structures are less  predictable. Indeed, a similar outcome also emerges 
for imperfectly competitive world market structures with a mark-up above 12%. When, for 
example, a 20% mark-up was considered, four of the corrected per unit transaction costs 
became negative, with the largest one being equal to -36 US$/t; when a mark-up equal to 
15% was modeled, the calibration generated two negative corrected transaction costs, the 
largest one being equal to – 21 US$/t. Even when the mark-up was set equal to 12% 
calibrating the model made two corrected transaction costs negative; however, in this case 
their values were judged to be within the range of possible measurement errors in border 
prices (the largest one in absolute value was – 12 US$/t). We conclude that market 
structures with international traders acting as non-cooperative oligopolists/oligopsonists 
with a resulting mark-up exceeding 12% are unfeasible in the banana market, being largely 
inconsistent with observed traded quantities and border prices. This means that, under the 
observed market shares and for the values of elasticities assumed, the competitive 
environment prevailing in the banana world trade is likely to be different from Cournot, and 
actually close to perfect competition (table 2). Policy assessments assuming a banana 
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market characterized by a degree of market power by traders significantly greater than  
those which we found feasible would generate distorted results and unsupported policy 
prescriptions.   
These results crucially depend on the assumptions made regarding the imperfectly 
competitive structures of the banana market. For example, we assume that only 
international traders are in the position to exert market power. However, it is often argued 
that downstream industries in developed countries, such as ripeners or retailers, may exert 
oligopsony and/or oligopoly power and, hence, in assessing the impact of a trade policy 
change it is necessary to take into account the vertical linkages by means of a successive 
oligopsony/oligopoly framework (Sexton et al., 2007; Hoque and Schroeter, 2010). To 
include the market power of downstream industries, such as retailers, in the models 
developed in this paper, information on banana retail prices and quantities in each importing 
country would be needed, and this information is not available. For this reason we decided 
not to consider additional market structures by extending to other downstream firms the 
possibility to exert market power and limited ourselves to the assumption that this is the 
case for international traders only; obviously, if this assumption is relaxed and one assumes 
instead that actors operating downstream exert market power, our results may no longer 
hold. 
 
5. Policy analysis results 
 
All the simulations have been generated with reference to 2019, the time horizon for the 
completion of the implementation of the December 2009 WTO agreement, assuming that no 
agreement on the modalities in agriculture in the DDA round is reached by the end of 2013.  
The “2019 base” reference model has been obtained from the “2007 base” by 
modeling changes in production, import demand and export supply functions in all 
countries/regions as a result of expected shifts in domestic demand and supply functions. 
Import demand and export supply functions shift according to expected changes, ceteris 
paribus, in quantities produced and consumed in each country/region. Consumption is 
assumed to vary over time on the basis of observed changes in population and per capita 
incomes (in constant terms) between 1997 and 2007, and 1995-97 and 2005-07, 
respectively;15 the values used for domestic demand income elasticities are provided in table 
1. Banana production in each country/region is assumed to change over time, ceteris 
paribus, in line with observed changes in production due to technical changes between 
1995-1997 and 2005-2007.16 The dollar/euro exchange rate in 2019 has been assumed to be 
1.4 (in the 2007 base model it was 1.371). 
                                                     
15 For country aggregates these are both weighted averages obtained using the shares of population in 2007 as 
weights. The data source is the World Development Indicators, by the World Bank. Negative percent changes 
have been set equal zero; percent changes larger than 5 have been set equal to 5 (table 1).  
16
  The annual rate of growth for production as a result of technical change is given by the annual rate of 
change in yields plus 1/3 of the annual rate of change in banana harvested area. For country aggregates these 
are weighted averages obtained using the shares of production in 2007 as weights. The data source is the 
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The results of the simulations are presented in tables 3 and 4. Five different market 
structures, found to be feasible given observed traded quantities and prices, have been 
considered: perfect competition and oligopoly/oligopsony with mark-up percentages equal 
to 3%, 6%, 9% and 12%. The results for the “2007 base” scenario are the same for all of 
them, each of the four models having been calibrated to reproduce the observed market 
equilibrium.  
 
Two policy scenarios in 2019 have been simulated in addition to the “base” reference 
one: a scenario in which only the EPAs are introduced, i.e. the EU removes the 775,000 t 
duty-free import quota on bananas originating in ACP countries and these may enter the EU 
duty-free and subject to no quantitative restriction, and a scenario in which, in addition to 
EPAs, the December 2009 WTO agreement is implemented, i.e. the MFN tariff imposed by 
the EU drops from 176€/t to 114€/t (import tariffs imposed by other countries remain 
unchanged).  
It may be useful to underline at the outset that the results under the five market 
structures should not be compared directly, as the models which generate them differ, not 
only in their assumptions regarding market structure, but in the per unit transaction costs as 
well (because of the differences in the results of the calibration procedure for the five 
models); in fact, corrected transaction costs (tcij + λ*ij  in figures 1 and 2) become smaller 
and smaller as we move from perfect competition to increasing degrees of market power.
17
 
The simulation results obtained under the five market structures appear fairly close 
(tables 3 and 4). This comes as no surprise, given the relatively low degrees of market power 
which have been found to be feasible and have been considered in the analysis.    
 
Under all market structures the implementation of the EPAs generates consistent 
benefits for ACP countries, whose total exports increase by about 80% and whose export 
revenue triples, while MFN and LDC exports and export prices decline and imports by 
countries different from the EU increase; significant trade diversion occurs, with ACP exports 
previously directed to non-EU countries now being redirected toward the EU, and a 
consistent share of exports by MFN countries being diverted in the opposite direction. 
Assumptions made regarding the degree of market power do matter. The higher the 
percentage of mark-up, the higher tend to be percentage changes; this is so because 
calibrated transaction costs decline with the percentage of mark-up, with the effect of 
accentuating the impact of the policy change.18 The most significant differences in trade 
                                                                                                                                                                     
FAOSTAT database. Negative rates have been set equal zero; rates larger than 5 have been set equal to 5 (table 
1). 
17
 This means that differences between simulation results referring to, for example, the perfect competition 
and the 6% mark-up scenario, cannot be interpreted as “the predicted changes if the market structure were an 
oligopoly/oligopsony represented through a 6% mark-up instead of a perfectly competitive one”, because they 
actually provide  “the predicted changes if the market structure were an oligopoly/oligopsony represented 
through a 6% mark-up instead of a perfectly competitive one and transaction costs were lower”. In fact, while 
results presented in table 3 show volumes of EU imports under the “EPA + December 2009 agreement” which 
increase with firms’ market power, the contrary would emerge if the models were run using the same per unit 
transaction costs. 
18
 Some caution is needed when the scenario with a mark-up equal to 12% is considered, as this involves, as 
mentioned above, two transaction costs which are less than zero, albeit small in absolute value. 
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flows between the results obtained under the five market structures relate to LDC exports. 
Under perfect competition, in the 2019 base scenario and in the scenario with the EPAs only 
all their exports are directed towards the EU, and they decline by 7.1% when the EPAs are 
implemented; when the imperfectly competitive market structures are assumed, LDC do not 
export to the EU in the 2019 base scenario, but find it profitable to do so when the EPAs are 
implemented, with their exports declining by between 4 and 6%, less than forecast under 
the perfect competition scenario. What happens here is that the profitability of LDC exports 
to the EU and the Rest of the world markets is very close and the reduction of the import 
price in the latter (because of the outward shift in the export supply towards them by MFN 
countries) makes exporting to the former more profitable, although LDCs are now able to 
export less. 
 
As the degree of market power increases, market structure makes the difference, not 
only in terms of the expected magnitude of the impact of policy changes on the different 
agents involved, but in terms of its sign as well. This is the case for the change of the EU 
import price, and, as a consequence, for EU consumption and imports. This result is due to 
the fact that EPAs, on the one hand, make ACP exports on the EU market more competitive 
but, on the other, ACP export prices being higher than MFN ones, and per unit profits on 
ACP exports being higher than those on MFN exports, pushes the EU import price for 
bananas upward. When this effect, which increases with the percentage of mark-up, 
outweighs the effect in the opposite direction of the partial liberalization of its banana 
imports, the EU price increases. 
 
Firms’ profits increase with the introduction of the EPAs. Again, ACP are less efficient 
banana producers and show significantly higher export prices than MFN exporters; this helps 
the positive effect on firms’ profits of increased ACP exports and export prices overcome the 
effect in the opposite direction of lower MFN and LDC exports and export prices.  
Hence, when intermediaries exert market power and preferred country producers are 
less efficient than MFN ones, an expansion of the margin of preference may increase, rather 
than decrease, EU domestic price because of the increase in the traders’ profit margin. The 
expected gains from expanded preferences for EU consumers can thus vanish because of the 
presence of intermediaries exerting market power. This outcome would not emerge under 
perfect competition.  
When the implementation of the December 2009 WTO agreement is simulated (in 
addition to the EPAs), the effects of the preference erosion for ACP exports are marked and 
of the same order of magnitude under all market structures. ACP banana exports, all still 
directed to the EU, decline by around 15%, while MFN exports increase by 3.6%; those 
directed to the EU expand by over 90%, as trade diversion occurs in addition to trade 
creation. The increase in import prices in non-EU markets and the decline of the EU import 
price cause LDC exports to be redirected from the EU to the Rest of the world; thanks to the 
lower transaction costs to this destination compared to the EU, LDC exports increase by 1%. 
The 2009 WTO agreement causes a decline in profits, albeit by 2% only, because of the lower 
volume of ACP exports, which are more profitable for the traders than MFN ones; in 
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addition, the decline in profits comes from the negative effects on per unit profits of the 
lower imports by the US and the Rest of the world, and those, of the opposite sign, of the 
larger volume of EU imports and higher export prices in MFN and LDC countries. While the 
EPAs produced little change in the EU domestic market, the WTO agreement causes a 
decline in the EU domestic price of around 10%, an increase in consumption of 5% and an 
increase in imports of a little more than 5%; on the contrary, EU production changes very 
little, as EU domestic policy for bananas makes only production in Greece, Portugal and 
Cyprus (which jointly account for a very small share of EU banana production) react to 
market signals (Anania, 2008). For the reasons discussed above, the magnitude of 
percentage changes increases with the percentage of mark-up and firms’ market power. 
 The joint impact of the EPAs and the WTO agreement with respect to the “2019 base”, 
which is reported in the five columns at the right end of table 4, shows that the reduction of 
the preferential margin due to the WTO agreement does not cancel out the benefits to ACP 
countries from the EPAs; in fact, when the WTO agreement is implemented their exports 
and export revenues remain significantly above those in the base scenario (by more than 50 
and 110%, respectively). Analogously, despite the trade creation effect of the reduction from 
176 to 114 €/t of the tariff they face, MFN countries are not able to fully recover from the 
loss of competitiveness vis a vis ACP countries resulting from the EPAs, and their exports and 
export revenue remain slightly below those in the base scenario. 
 
6. Conclusions  
The goal of this paper was to address the importance of the assumptions made about 
market structure and traders’ behavior in empirical trade policy analysis. We believe its 
contribution to unraveling this issue is threefold: it develops two original models which 
incorporate imperfectly competitive market structures in a spatial modeling framework; it 
proposes a procedure to assess the degree of market power in international markets which 
is applied to banana trade and, finally, it shows how the assessment of the effects of the 
most recent EU import regimes for bananas is affected by assumptions made on the 
prevailing market structure.      
 
The paper develops two modified versions of the Takayama and Judge (1971) spatial 
trade model. The first model includes a cartel of the firms handling international trade. The 
second model incorporates oligopolistic and oligopsonistic behaviors of trading firms 
through a mark-up; this modeling framework has the advantage of being flexible, easy to 
implement and does not require identification of conjectural variation parameters, which 
would imply making explicit assumptions about the number and symmetry of the firms 
exporting to each importing market. The percentage of mark-up provides a representation 
of the degree of market power without having to make restrictive assumptions about the 
nature of competition.  
The two step calibration procedure used to make the model replicate observed 
country net trade positions provides a useful tool to address an important issue for empirical 
policy analysis, that is: what is the range of degree of market power in the market under 
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scrutiny? Reducing the space of the feasible market structures is relevant in assessing the 
effects of trade policy changes as these may crucially depend on assumptions made on the 
degree of market power exerted by relevant actors.  
Indeed, the result of the analysis presented in the paper for the banana market is that 
some of the market structures hypothesized turn out to be unfeasible, being largely 
inconsistent with observed traded quantities and border prices. This happens when a cartel 
maximizing firms’ joint profits is assumed, but also for imperfectly competitive world market 
structures where the  mark-up is above 12%.  In fact, the results show that observed data 
are only consistent with market behaviors which are far away from Cournot and, actually, 
are close to perfect competition under most values of demand elasticities and market 
shares. This result appears even more important  given the high concentration of 
international trade of bananas.   
Regardless of the market structure considered, the implementation of the EPAs is 
expected to increase ACP exports to the EU significantly and generate overall consistent 
benefits for ACP countries; trade diversion occurs, with ACP exports previously directed to 
non-EU countries now redirected toward the latter. The 2009 WTO agreement significantly 
reduces the preferential margin for ACP countries, but does not offset the benefits from the 
EPAs; as a whole, with both the EPAs and the WTO agreement in place, ACP countries are 
better off in terms of both exports and export revenues. Analogously, despite the trade 
creation effect of the lower tariff they face on the EU market, the WTO agreement does not 
compensate MFN countries for the loss of competitiveness vis a vis ACP countries as a result 
of the EPAs.  
Because of the relatively low level of market power, simulation results are quite similar 
across the five market structures considered. However, the results show that as the feasible 
degree of market power increases, market structure matters not only in terms of the 
expected magnitude of the impact on the different agents involved, but in terms of its sign 
as well.  
The findings of this paper, and especially those concerning the degree of market power 
in the world market for bananas, depend upon a number of assumptions, common to most 
empirical studies on agricultural commodities, the most important of which are that: 
products are homogeneous; upstream and downstream firms have no market power; the 
policy changes considered have no effect on firm behavior or market structure. The removal 
of any of the above is likely to affect the results reached; however, this would imply the use 
of a completely different modeling framework and data needs which would be difficult to 
satisfy.  Notwithstanding these simplifying assumptions, this paper proposes within a spatial 
framework an innovative and  relatively simple procedure to assess the market power of 
intermediaries in empirical trade policy analysis; because of the importance of assumptions 
made regarding market structure in policy analysis, we believe that this approach could be 
useful to better evaluate the impact of trade policies.              
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Table 1 - Base model input data (2007).
Country/Region
Net Imports1     
(000 t)
Net 
Exports2  
(000 t)
Import 
Prices ($/t)
Export 
Prices ($/t)
Export 
Supply 
Price 
Elasticities
Import 
Demand 
Price 
Elasticities
Domestic 
Demand 
Income 
Elasticities
% Yearly 
Changes in 
Supply Due 
to 
Technical 
Changes3
% Yearly 
Changes in 
Population
% Yearly 
Changes in 
Per Capita 
GDP
EU-15 5055,1 844,7 -0,50 0,5 0,49 1,95
EU-12 249,1 810,8 -0,75 0,5 -0,25 4,23
USA 3544,3 358,0 -0,40 0,4 2,79 1,00 2,01
Other importers 7249,8 491,9 -0,80 0,5 5,00 0,82 5
Spain 361,4 610,0 1,0 0,46
France 238,8 500,0 1,0 2,10
Portugal 17,2 1190,0 1,0 0,22
Greece 2,9 720,0 1,0 2,08
Cyprus 6,0 700,0 1,0 0,00
Ivory Coast 290,8 371,0 1,5 0,5 2,95 2,36 0,00
Cameroon 224,5 290,0 1,5 0,5 1,54 2,36 1,63
Dominican Republic 215,1 347,3 1,0 0,5 5,00 1,56 3,81
Belize and Suriname 115,5 373,5 1,0 0,5 3,20 1,98 2,46
Other ACP non LDC 89,4 450,0 1,0 0,5 3,28 2,06 1,06
Ecuador 5285,6 246,4 1,3 0,5 0,33 1,24 1,88
Colombia 1660,7 325,6 1,3 0,5 1,02 1,62 1,20
Costa Rica 2273,4 299,0 1,0 0,5 1,57 2,00 2,95
Panama 436,3 255,6 1,0 0,5 0,06 1,85 3,09
Honduras 514,9 270,0 1,5 0,5 0,27 2,06 1,96
Brazil 185,7 238,5 1,0 0,5 2,58 1,33 1,21
Guatemala 1518,6 211,4 1,5 0,5 2,76 2,46 1,24
Other MFN exporters non LDC 2578,9 195,2 1,0 0,5 3,30 1,57 3,77
LDC 82,6 204,5 1,5 0,5 5,00 2,75 1,70
Source: Comtrade, Faostat.
1:  For EU-15 and EU-10 apparent consumption (imports + domestic production - exports). 
2:  For France average production in 2005-2007, to smooth the effects of hurricane Dean (August 2007). No data available for Cameroon and Suriname as 
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Table 2 : Mark-up values under different market structures (%)
20 16 11 7 5 3
ε=0.5
Perfect competition/Bertrand 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cournot-Nash 10 12.5 18 28.6 40 66.7
Cartel 200 200 200 200 200 200
ε=0.75
Perfect competition/Bertrand 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cournot-Nash 6.7 8.3 12.1 19.0 26.7 44.4
Cartel 133 133 133 133 133 133
number of firms 
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2019 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
2019 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
2019 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
2019 base EPA only
   EPA  +        
Dec 2009 
Agreement
EU production (000 t) 626 575 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572 574 574 572
EU consumption (000 t) 5.304 6.415 6.451 6.753 6.441 6.451 6.762 6.470 6.451 6.771 6.498 6.451 6.781
EU15 border price (euro) 616,1 600,6 593,9 536,5 596,0 593,8 534,8 591,0 593,8 533,1 586,1 593,8 531,4
EU imports (000 t) 4.678 5.840 5.876 6.181 5.867 5.877 6.190 5.895 5.876 6.199 5.924 5.877 6.208
EU imports from ACP (000 t) 855 950 2.433 2.068 923 2.407 2.041 896 2.381 2.016 867 2.357 1.992
EU imports from MFN (000 t) 3.823 3.448 2.103 4.113 4.944 2.126 4.149 5.000 2.148 4.183 5.057 2.169 4.216
EU imports from LDC (000 t) 0 1.443 1.340 0 0 1.344 0 0 1.347 0 0 1.351 0
USA imports (000 t) 3.544 4.440 4.486 4.454 4.436 4.487 4.454 4.434 4.488 4.453 4.433 4.489 4.453
ROW imports (000 t) 7.250 7.949 8.095 7.994 7.937 8.099 7.993 7.932 8.102 7.993 7.928 8.105 7.992
ACP total exports (000 t) 935 1.353 2.433 2.068 1.328 2.407 2.041 1.302 2.381 2.016 1.274 2.357 1.992
MFN total exports (000 t) 14.454 15.434 14.684 15.205 15.514 14.712 15.236 15.556 14.738 15.265 15.601 14.762 15.293
LDC total exports (000 t) 83 1.443 1.340 1.356 1.398 1.344 1.360 1.404 1.347 1.364 1.410 1.351 1.368
ACP export revenue (mill US$) 331,1 489,5 1.449,0 1.066,7 474,0 1.419,9 1.042,0 458,7 1.392,7 1.019,1 443,1 1.367,4 997,8
MFN export revenue (mill US$) 3.642,1 3.758,6 3.443,2 3.661,0 3.793,3 3.454,4 3.674,0 3.811,6 3.465,1 3.686,5 3.830,8 3.475,3 3.698,3
LDC export revenue (mill US$) 16,9 289,4 256,2 261,2 274,7 257,4 262,5 276,6 258,5 263,8 278,6 259,6 265,0
Traders' profits (mill US$) 0,0 0,0 0,0 250,1 289,1 282,6 484,1 561,6 548,6 703,6 819,0 799,5
Table 3 - Simulation results.
2007 base
Perfect competition Mark-up 3% Mark-up 6% Mark-up 9%
Page 26 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
26 
 
 
 
 
Page 27 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
27 
 
EDj
ESi
tcijλ*ij
Xij
Pi
Pj
uncalibrated 
model solutionA
observed market 
equilibrium
P°j
P°i
X°ij
 
Figure 1  Perfect competition. Observed market equilibrium, uncalibrated and 
calibrated model solution. 
 
 
Figure 2  Imperfect competition, mark-up. Observed market equilibrium,  
uncalibrated and calibrated model solution. 
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Figure 3  Imperfect competition, cartel. Observed market equilibrium,  
uncalibrated and calibrated model solution. 
 
 
